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I. Introduction
In 1999, the United States government decided to accept up to 12,000 
Somali Bantu refugees for resettlement. The refugees, who had lived in 
Kenyan refugee camps since fleeing Somalia’s civil war in 1992, were 
the largest group of African refugees ever accepted for resettlement 
in the United States. As illiterate, non-English speaking, uneducated, 
rural subsistence farmers, they were also markedly different from most 
previously admitted refugees. Only a miniscule number of African ref-
ugees had been accepted for resettlement during the Cold War years, 
when the U.S. defined a refugee as someone fleeing communism and 
almost all admitted refugees came from Soviet Bloc countries, Cuba, 
and Indochina. To many observers, the decision to accept Somali Bantu 
refugees appeared to mark a new direction in U.S. refugee resettlement 
policy from one motivated by foreign policy concerns and national 
interest priorities to one defined by an ethic of humanitarianism.
II. The Background
The 1999 offer of refuge to Somali Bantu refugees was based on 
their identification as a persecuted minority group who could never 
be expected to return to Somalia. The majority of those identified as 
Somali Bantu came from farming communities along the Jubba and 
Shabelle rivers in southern Somalia and who were considered physi-
cally distinct from other Somalis and inferior in status because of their 
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non-Somali ancestry and occupation. Some are descended from East 
African slaves imported into Somalia in the 19th century; others are 
descended from farming communities that were already settled along 
the Shabelle River prior to the arrival in the Horn of Somali-speaking 
pastoralists centuries ago.1 While the majority of Somali Bantu shared 
linguistic, cultural, and religious practices with other Somalis, their 
racialized identity, distinct ancestry, and sedentary life as farmers dis-
tinguished them from other Somalis and made them vulnerable targets 
in Somalia’s civil war.
After the 1991 collapse of Somalia’s government, Somali militias rav-
aged farming villages along the Jubba Valley with rape, murder, pil-
lage, torture, kidnapping, and extortion in an onslaught of violence that 
Somalia expert Kenneth Menkhaus has called “a holocaust.”2 Human 
rights organizations at the time catalogued the horrors experienced by 
Somalia’s minority farmers, describing how they were attacked by all 
factions and defended by none.3
Like other Somalis escaping the militia violence, Somalia’s minor-
ity farmers also fled to the sprawling Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya 
where they experienced further abuse from other refugees. Camp 
administrators and international aid workers reported the humiliating 
treatment of minorities in the camps, where they had greater difficulty 
accessing food, shelter, and firewood, and suffered higher levels of 
rape, assault, and the looting of food by their fellow refugees.4 Minor-
ity Somalis also performed most of the manual labor in the camps, 
such as construction, portage, digging latrines, and hauling water.5 
By 1993, the minority Somalis had developed a shared ethnic self-con-
sciousness and a leadership that had begun to investigate resettlement 
options. Along with camp administrators, the leaders began using the 
term “Somali Bantu” to distinguish and encompass minority Somalis 
in order to seek additional forms of protection.6 By 1995, the United 
Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) had identified the 
Somali Bantu as a “priority protection case worthy of third-country 
resettlement,” according to a former UNHCR field officer in Dadaab.7 
Efforts in 1993 and 1997 to resettle the Somali Bantu in Tanzania and 
Mozambique—from where some of their ancestors had originated—
had failed and the UNHCR began negotiating with non-African coun-
tries for a resettlement solution.8
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III. A Humanitarian Choice?
Cold War politics dominated U.S. resettlement priorities from the 1950s 
until the early 1990s, during which time the U.S. resettled over two mil-
lion refugees, more than 90 percent of whom were from Communist 
countries.9 Although the Refugee Act of 1980 broadened the definition 
of refugee to include people from other areas of the world, the number 
of Africans accepted for resettlement in the United States remained tiny, 
especially in relation to the growing number of refugees within Africa. 
Legal scholar Heidi Boas argues that the U.S. offer of resettlement to 
Somali Bantu (as well as to the Sudanese “Lost Boys”) demonstrated 
that the power of interest groups and the ethic of humanitarianism 
had become more significant than foreign policy objectives in the deci-
sion about who would receive refuge.10 Members of the Congressio-
nal Black Caucus, some of whom participated in NGO-hosted trips 
to African refugee camps during the 1990s, successfully lobbied to 
raise the ceiling on African refugees accepted for resettlement. Aware 
of this pressure, the UNHCR advocated for Somali Bantus as a par-
ticularly vulnerable group. In response the United States offered them 
P2 status, which is a status given to groups “of special humanitarian 
concern.” It is noteworthy that the Center for Immigration Studies, a 
partisan anti-immigrant organization, lamented the offer of refuge to 
Somali Bantus as indicative of a shift from foreign policy and national 
interest to a “global human rights agenda” as the guiding force of U.S. 
refugee resettlement.11
Following the announcement of the resettlement plan, news reports 
across the U.S. promoted the image of U.S. humanitarian benevolence 
in choosing the Somali Bantu for resettlement. Because of their illit-
eracy, lack of education, rural background, large families, and history 
of persecution, Somali Bantu were widely described as particularly 
needy and unprepared for modern life. Descriptions such as “Africa’s 
lost tribe” (New York Times 2003), “feudal serfs” (Refugees Magazine 
2002), and “among the most persecuted people on earth” (National 
Geographic 2003) highlighted their vulnerability, simple background, 
technological naiveté, and history of exploitation as the descendents of 
slaves.12
News accounts also revealed acute fascination with a primitive-
meets-modern theme, demonstrated in the repeated contrast between 
Somali Bantu pre-war life and the life that awaited them in the U.S.: 
“Most have never seen a light switch or telephone, or even a building 
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that wasn’t made of mud” (Newsweek 2002); “They are sturdy farm-
workers with few other skills, who have never turned on an electric 
light switch, used a flush toilet, crossed a busy street, ridden in a car 
or on an elevator, seen snow or experienced air conditioning” (Refu-
gees Magazine 2002); and they are “almost completely untouched by 
modern life…They measure time by watching the sun rise and fall over 
their green fields and mud huts” (New York Times 2003).13
A Horatio Alger undercurrent accompanied their characterization 
as contemporary primitives. An editorial in Refugee Magazine (2002) 
called them “a lucky few” and a New York Times article lauded the 
U.S. as “A Place of Miracles” for the refugees, while the Center for 
Immigration Studies complained that Somali Bantu refugees won “the 
jackpot” with the “dazzling” opportunity to come to America.14 While 
celebrating the “dazzling” opportunity afforded by the resettlement 
plan news accounts and policy documents nevertheless predicted that 
the transition to life in the U.S. would be difficult and challenging for 
resettled Somali Bantu. That the United States was willing to accept 
such people implied that a humanitarian ethic, rather than national 
self-interest, had motivated the resettlement offer. This coincides with 
the argument of legal scholar Heidi Boas, who published the first aca-
demic analysis of the Somali Bantu resettlement. Noting that Somali 
Bantu needed “round the clock help in navigating through a culture so 
different from their own,” Boas writes, “Given the extreme difficulty 
the Somali Bantu were predicted to have in adapting to American 
life, it seems particularly significant that the U.S. government selected 
them for resettlement.”15 Her article documents how the hard work of 
refugee activists, along with a push by the U.S. Congressional Black 
Caucus to correct the racial imbalance of refugee acceptance during the 
1990s, spurred the humanitarian choice to select for resettlement a very 
small group who brought no relevant skills, education, resources, fam-
ily ties, or international significance with them.
IV. The Resettlement Process
The attacks of September 11, 2001 challenged the humanitarian ratio-
nale for Somali Bantu resettlement. Although the U.S. State Depart-
ment announced the Somali Bantu P2 designation in December 1999,16 
it took almost four years to resettle the first Somali Bantu family 
because of numerous delays. Indeed, congressional testimony about 
the post 9/11 fate of the Somali Bantu raises questions about the initial 
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humanitarian commitment. Bill Frelick, Director of Policy for the U.S. 
Committee on Refugees, expressed his frustration with the attitude of 
the government toward resettling refugees in his February 12, 2002 tes-
timony to the Senate Judiciary Immigration Subcommittee:
I will hasten to add that very few of the groups that I would mention 
would be ones that would unfamiliar [sic] to the State Department. We 
have been in discussions with them for years on some of these groups, 
Somali Bantu in Kenya, for example, or the Baku Armenians in Moscow, 
and I’d have to say that the response has often been bureaucratic, pas-
sive, and at times downright uncaring and cynical.17
Leonard Glickman of the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society broke in to 
add that although the State Department had appeared to be reforming 
the resettlement process:
It sort of ground to a halt this end of the summer, this past fall, and 
nothing has happened, and I think one of the most startling examples 
of that is the Somali Bantu. I mean, it was clearly identified as a group 
that were in need of resettlement, in need of the protection of the United 
States. Everybody was on the same page, including PRM [U.S. State 
Department Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration], that this 
was a group that—and UNHCR, that this was a group that needed our 
services, and not a single Somali Bantu has arrived in the United States. 
It’s outrageous.18
Defending the resettlement policy, Gene Dewey, the newly minted 
Director of PRM, reminded the Senate Subcommittee: “Perhaps only 
in America are the people and its leaders capable of waging a major 
military campaign while keeping the imperatives of humanity both in 
assistance and refugee admissions at the top of the national agenda.” 
In fact, refugee admissions were not a priority that year, when the 
U.S. filled far less than half of the 70,000 slots designated for refugees. 
Despite the fact that the Somali Bantu had already been accepted and 
screened for resettlement, they were given none of the 2002 slots and 
only 803 of the 70,000 slots in 2003.19
The primary reason for the delays, catalogued in a State Department 
“Case Study of Processing Complexity and Unforeseen Delays,” was 
security concerns.20 The Somali Bantu had been through a screening 
process in 1997 after the failed resettlement effort in Mozambique. 
In 2001, the UNHCR and State Department completed a thorough 
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re-verification of the Somali Bantu from the 1997 list, but because the 
Dadaab refugee camp was deemed too dangerous for U.S. personnel to 
visit for the final screening, the agencies decided to truck all 11,860 re-
verified Somali Bantu over 900 miles to distant Kakuma refugee camp 
in the northwest corner of Kenya at a cost of US $2.7 million. (In a wry 
aside, The Economist commented, “They have been through a lot—per-
secution in their homeland, civil war, a decade languishing in refugee 
camps, and the tragi-comic experience of being trucked across Kenya 
to meet American officials who dared not visit them.”21)
The first planned visit to Kakuma by Department of Homeland 
Security officers was cancelled because of fears of insecurity for U.S. 
personnel in the camp. Processing was further delayed by a corruption 
scandal. An unexplained post-approval processing delay blocked any 
resettlements in 2002 and 2003. With no hint of irony, the State Depart-
ment report explained, “This lag necessitated a new round of security 
and medical clearances, because such clearances are good only for a 
limited period.” New security concerns, and then flooding, further 
delayed the processing of new cases until 2004, by which time the 
processing of most Somali Bantu had taken five years.22 By the advent 
of their resettlement, they, like other refugees who experienced similar 
processing, were “one of the most heavily screened groups of prospec-
tive immigrants to the U.S.”23
Bill Frelick argues that during this period, U.S. policy toward refu-
gees had shifted to a new, post-9/11 “security model”: “[I]n the early 
twenty-first century, refugees often came to be regarded with deep 
suspicion, sometimes seen as being terrorists themselves or as being 
the sea in which the terrorist fish could hide and swim. Fear of terror-
ism often exacerbated preexisting xenophobic and racist tendencies.”24 
Whereas during the Cold War years, refugees were viewed as heroic, 
freedom loving, and politically valuable, Frelick says that after 9/11 
they were suspected of colluding with terrorists: “Under the security 
paradigm, refugees are devalued to the point where providing asylum 
or intervening to provide source-country solutions are trumped by the 
desire to keep terrorists out.”25
After the first few hundred Somali Bantu finally began arriving in 
2003, the bulk of the population arrived during 2004–06. Their transi-
tion to life in America raises many questions about how “humanitarian-
ism” is conceived within the American system of refugee resettlement.
Since 2006, I have been conducting ethnographic fieldwork with 
the large Somali Bantu community in Lewiston, Maine, augmented 
Catherine Besteman
17
by visits to the Somali Bantu communities of their family members in 
Hartford, Connecticut, and Syracuse, New York. Many members of 
the Somali Bantu community come from the village in Somalia where 
I conducted ethnographic research in 1987–88 and thus I know their 
family histories well. My research in Lewiston has many different 
components and has included personal and group interviews with 
refugees, citizens, service providers, journalists, police officers, teach-
ers, physicians, and city officials; focus group interviews with local 
service providers and ethnic mutual assistance associations; dozens 
of hours in schools, ESL (English as a Second Language) courses, citi-
zenship classes, and after-school tutoring programs for refugees; sup-
port work for the boards of local service agencies, advocacy groups, 
community groups, and ethnic mutual assistance associations that aid 
refugees; and public outreach projects developed collaboratively with 
members of the refugee community such as museum exhibitions for 
two local museums, public lectures and presentations, ESL booklets, 
public reports, and media interviews.
V. Life in America
As noted earlier, many observers predicted a rocky transition in store 
for Somali Bantu refugees in the U.S. Like the Hmong refugees from 
Southeast Asia, who were resettled in the 1970s and 1980s, the vast 
majority of the Somali Bantu refugees did not speak English, were 
illiterate even in their own language, and had made their living as 
small-scale farmers in rural areas unserved by electricity, paved 
roads, running water, schools, or modern medical facilities. Unlike the 
Hmong, they arrived in the U.S. under the hegemony of neo-liberal 
ideology, strong anti-immigrant sentiment, and fear of Muslim terror-
ism. Furthermore, whereas many Americans understood the connec-
tion between the United States and the regions from where Hmong 
originated because of the Vietnam War, the relationship of the United 
States to the Horn of Africa was far less clear.
Although there was plenty of warning from those involved in the 
resettlement process that the Somali Bantu would need a great deal of 
support to make the transition to life in the U.S., no special allowance 
was made for their adjustment. For example, the information clearing-
house for refugee resettlement, Bridging Refugee Youth and Childrens’ 
Services (BRYCS, www.brycs.org) posted numerous online reports 
about resettlement issues for Somali Bantu. A Newsweek article about 
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the impending arrival of Somali Bantu muses: “What happens next 
is surprisingly unclear…Some relief officials worry that the govern-
ment isn’t doing enough to ready the Bantus for life in America, and 
that those who are unable to find jobs will wind up trading one kind 
of poverty for another.” “We are doing them a disservice by not pre-
paring them properly,” says Kate Hilton-Hayward, who co-chairs the 
Somali Bantu Task Force at the Refugee Council USA. “If the economy 
bottoms out, we may have trouble finding them jobs,” she admits. The 
article concludes by quoting one man awaiting resettlement: “ ‘I hear 
the government lets you keep a cow wherever you want in America,’ 
he says with obvious pleasure. ‘I need a cow, because I need fresh 
milk.’ Imagine his surprise.”26 In fact, Somali Bantus received far less 
support than had the Hmong. Hmong refugees received up to three 
years of direct federal support, as well as greater support for English 
language classes. Somali Bantu were expected to be entirely self-suf-
ficient within eight months of their arrival in the U.S.
This expectation of near immediate self-sufficiency reveals a great 
deal about the guiding principles of refugee resettlement in the U.S. 
Heidi Boas flatly states that the policy of rapid self-sufficiency con-
demns refugees to an intergenerational cycle of poverty and “is hardly 
a humanitarian act on the part of the United States.”27
Refuge resettlement in the United States is handled by ten different 
nonprofit agencies (called VOLAGS, for voluntary agencies) that, in 
effect, bid on the number of refugees they can resettle in their respec-
tive locations. Every year, each of the VOLAGS submits its bid to the 
State Department, which apportions the refugees arriving that year 
amongst the VOLAGS who resettle them in various locations across 
the country. The VOLAGS are responsible for meeting the arriving 
refugees at the airport, providing some cultural orientation training, 
settling them in housing, enrolling the children in school and the non-
English speaking adults in ESL classes, and if possible helping those 
over the age of sixteen to apply for jobs. Their contracts for assisting 
new refugees end after 90 days.
The role of VOLAGS in the resettlement process has its contradic-
tions because they are self-identified as humanitarian but through the 
competitive bid system and attenuated resettlement schedule, they 
must operate like businesses. They are contracted and funded by the 
federal government to provide caseworker assistance to refugees dur-
ing their first weeks in the U.S., but have no enduring connection or 
obligation to those they resettle after their contracts cease. There is 
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little follow up or accountability from the government to assess how 
the resettled refugees are faring.
In addition to support from VOLAG caseworkers, refugees who 
qualify could receive $230 per person per month (in 2010) through the 
federal Refugee Cash Assistance Program for their first eight months. 
The U.S. Office of Refugee Resettlement is quite clear that when these 
funds end, refugees are expected to be self-sufficient and no longer in 
need of federal, state, or local support. As a VOLAG manager in Maine 
told me, “The ultimate goal of the reception and placement program 
is that clients will be self-sufficient within 90 days.” VOLAGS are sup-
posed to try to keep refugees off the welfare roles and thus one of 
their primary concerns is moving resettled refugees as quickly as pos-
sible into available jobs, which are usually poorly paid, undesirable, 
unskilled jobs with no opportunities for training or career develop-
ment. After their first year, refugees are also required to begin repay-
ing the cost of their airfare from the refugee camp to the U.S.
Following the resettlement of Somali Bantu in cities across the coun-
try, news articles began appearing about their shock at the high cost of 
living; their challenge to find jobs that do not require English, literacy, 
or any education; and their struggles to make ends meet. Many fami-
lies found they could not afford the rent for the apartments where they 
were settled by the VOLAGs after their federal support ended. Some 
families fell immediately into debt because they did not understand 
how to turn down the heat or realize the high cost of long-distance 
phone calls and thus ran up enormous bills that they could not pay. 
Those who acquired jobs found that the $7–8 per hour they could earn 
barely supported their family.
Anthropologists have had harsh things to say about the expecta-
tion of nearly immediate self-sufficiency for war-traumatized resettled 
refugees, especially those who lack English and relevant job skills. 
Writing about Cambodians resettled in California, Aihwa Ong traces 
the administrative logic that constructs new subjectivities for resettled 
refugees. She describes how the “helping professions” who work with 
refugees focus their assistance on providing training to make reset-
tled refugees into “cheap labor for America’s postindustrial economy,” 
expected to work in any kind of high flexibility “junk job” that comes 
their way. She concludes that newcomers are taught by VOLAGS and 
social service providers to constitute themselves as neo-liberal citizen-
subjects who are supposed to replace their networks of reciprocal care 
and tight community integration with an emphasis on independence, 
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autonomy, and individualism, even though there is no assurance that 
they will ever obtain economic security.28
Both Ong and Fethi Keles, who has worked with Balkan refugees 
in upstate New York, argue that the neo-liberal emphasis on economic 
independence and self-sufficiency is fundamentally dehumanizing 
for resettled refugees. It strips them of a positive sense of connection 
to broader immigrant networks who pool resources, of self-esteem 
because of the expectation that they are destined for the lowest quality 
jobs, of their own cultural values, and of the validity of their personal 
history. It almost ensures that they will enter the American underclass 
and struggle with poverty. Keles writes of the impact on mental health 
of refugees who are struggling to make ends meet and who feel inad-
equate and socially unmoored from their past: “The neo-liberal work 
ethic hermetically seals possible avenues to socialization, emphasizes 
economic independence and self sufficiency above all else and seems 
to expect refugees to continually rewrite their fates anew, never look-
ing back at either their past jobs and skills or their past identities.”29
Read through this lens, the resettlement process for refugees like 
the Somali Bantu in the U.S. appears strangely uncharitable. Is the 
“humanitarian charity” provided by resettlement defined only by 
geography, in that Somali Bantu refugees were allowed to come here, 
at their own expense, and receive a few months of very limited sup-
port? Does humanitarianism only extend to the concept of refuge in 
a physical sense: that the U.S. will provide a relatively safe physical 
environment within which refugees can attempt, with very little assis-
tance, to create a new future?
VI. What Happened in Lewiston
My family came here without a dime in their pocket. There was no wel-
fare system to leech off. They had to make it work and they did. They 
made Lewiston/Auburn what it is today. They didn’t do it so refugees 
could rape our system till it’s dry.
 liam, blog in response to a January 30, 2010 Lewiston Sun Journal 
article about Lewiston’s experience with refugees.
These are NOT United States citizens on United States Soil and are a 
threat to National Security just as any other terrorist is. These are terror-
ists.
 ArmyMom, blog in response to a December 17, 2009 Lewiston Sun 
Journal article about a police investigation of alleged attacks by 
Somalis in downtown Lewiston.
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Am I disgruntled that federal and state dollars are being used to sup-
ply immigrants with housing food clothes and vehicles? YOUR DAMN 
STRAIGHT.
Dee In Maine
They [Somali refugees] are human leaches brought her to suck off the lib-
eral maine system…When did maine become the welfare state to house 
and feed the worlds misfits.
Megalito
The Somalis over-populated Lewiston, drained it’s money and resources, 
and cried discrimination constantly…They are at DHHS [Department of 
Health and Human Services] requesting welfare daily. The majority of 
Somalis are unemployed. Our schools are overcrowded with children 
who don’t speak English. Lewiston…is down the tubes.
cojr
Online blogs (with original spelling) in response to a January 2009 article 
in Newsweek claiming that the arrival of refugees saved Lewiston.30
Lewiston was not prepared for the arrival of refugees. The city of 
about 35,000 is an old mill town built largely by French Canadians 
who came to work in the textile and shoe mills a century ago. Although 
Bates College brings a temporary influx of students every year, the 
city’s population has remained predominantly Franco-American, 
Catholic, and insular. When the late 20th century wave of deindustrial-
ization closed the mills, Lewiston started losing its youth to more pros-
perous places and few immigrants chose Lewiston as their new home. 
The densely packed tenement apartments in the downtown area had 
many low rent vacancies and the city’s almost entirely white popula-
tion was shrinking.
In 2001, a few Somali refugee families relocated to Lewiston from 
their initial resettlement sites. After refugees are resettled by a VOLAG 
they are under no obligation to remain in that location and VOLAGS 
are under no obligation to track those refugees. Many Somali refu-
gees were initially settled in public housing projects in large cities like 
Atlanta and St. Louis, where they felt unsafe and insecure. After their 
first few months, a few families relocated to Portland, Maine, to join 
relatives, and gradually more families began moving up to Maine. By 
early 2001, public housing in Portland was full and the city sent a few 
Somali families further north to Lewiston. After settling in Lewiston, 
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those families invited their relatives to join them from their primary 
resettlement cities, and the number of Somalis arriving in Lewiston 
began to grow throughout 2001. Within a year about a thousand had 
arrived. The city and the school district were totally unequipped for 
the arrival of so many secondary refugees.
The City of Lewiston’s General Assistance staff helped locate hous-
ing for the new arrivals, but by 2002 city staff felt administratively, 
economically, and socially overwhelmed by the influx of Somalis and 
by the lack of support from the state as well as area nonprofits and 
charitable organizations (including the sole VOLAG that operated 
in Maine, which was initially uninvolved in supporting secondary 
Somali migrants to Lewiston). City staff, who had little experience 
with refugee resettlement or cultural diversity, were trying to manage 
the provision of social services and educate themselves about the laws 
concerning refugees’ entitlements for benefits.31 The mayor addressed 
the matter by writing an open letter in 2002 to the Somali community 
asking them to stop moving to Lewiston, suggesting that they had 
emptied the city’s coffers and taxed city government to a breaking 
point.32 The ensuing storm of controversy brought a white supremacist 
group from Illinois to rally in defense of the city’s right to bar the door 
against black refugees, which shocked and upset many Lewistonians 
who did not perceive the mayor’s letter to be racist but rather driven 
by budgetary concerns. The white supremacist rally was met with a 
pro-diversity rally that attracted people from all over the state, includ-
ing Maine’s Governor and U.S. Senators.
As the controversy faded, more Somalis continued to arrive. Drawn 
by the presence of a Somali-speaking community and by the promise 
of physical security, safe schools, and low rents, Somali Bantus began 
relocating to Lewiston in late 2004 from their primary resettlement 
sites. By 2009, perhaps 5,000 Somalis and Somali Bantus had relocated 
to Lewiston (including a few hundred living in Auburn, the city adja-
cent to Lewiston). About 1,000 Somali-speaking children were enrolled 
in the Lewiston public schools. Somalis and Somali Bantus had become 
about 15 percent of the city’s population and a fifth of the school popu-
lation.
Because Lewiston had not been designated a primary resettlement 
site, it took many years to develop programs and services that sup-
ported the new refugee population. With the exception of the city’s 
hardworking General Assistance staff and the nonprofit Trinity Jubi-
lee Center (which redistributed donated food and clothing, provided 
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caseworker services, and ran an afterschool homework help program), 
most existing nonprofits and other service providers did not expand 
their services or client base to include refugees. As had happened in 
other cities, a complaint filed in 2006 against the School system for 
its failure to develop an appropriate ESL program brought in the U.S. 
Department of Justice to oversee its creation.33 Complaints against the 
hospitals obligated them to provide adequate translation services. The 
only VOLAG in the state, after an initial reluctance to become involved 
with the Somali refugees, finally agreed to work with federal grants 
to provide very basic services for secondary migrants, which primar-
ily consisted of cultural orientation and citizenship classes and case-
worker assistance. Even the federally funded downtown enterprise 
zone organization ignored the presence of a large population of refu-
gees in their targeted area and did not invite or include them in plan-
ning or funding projects.
In short, the overwhelming initial response in Lewiston to the arrival 
of thousands of refugees was business as usual. The expectation was 
that refugees would have to conform to local ways; that they deserved 
no special outreach, services, or programming; that their presence 
should have a minimal impact on the city; and that they should not 
diminish the resources available to Lewiston’s prior citizens. The many 
complaints about the new population quickly condensed into a set 
of powerful narratives that often began, “I’m not a racist, but… . ” 
The narratives reveal the ways in which Lewistonians felt that their 
city was under cultural and economic siege. In op ed essays, letters to 
the editor, blogs, and private conversations, Lewistonians complained 
that Somalis were not learning English fast enough, that the women’s 
distinct dress (including the hijab) was an affront to American norms, 
and even that Somalis kept live chickens in their kitchen cupboards. 
Many compared the assimilationist trajectory of their French-Canadian 
parents and grandparents with what they perceived to be the cultural 
isolationism of the Somalis. Simply put, many Lewistonians believed 
Somalis and Somali Bantus were not becoming American quickly 
enough and many suspected that the newcomers did not intend 
to embrace American cultural values. Many Lewistonians feared that 
the Muslim faith might even ally refugees with terrorist networks 
abroad. Somali women, in particular, were regularly targeted in public 
by people yelling things at them like “Go home” and “Dress like an 
American.”
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Especially virulent comments circulated in private discussions as 
well as in articles and on-line comments in the two local newspapers, 
the Lewiston Sun Journal and the Twin City Times, about the economic 
impact of the newcomers. Taking a cue from the mayor’s 2002 letter, 
Lewistonians reiterated to each other and to me that Somalis were 
an economic drain on the city, using up welfare benefits and public 
and low-income housing, and ravaging the school budget because of 
the need to create an ESL program. Myths circulated that all Somalis 
were unemployed and, in fact, did not want to work because they 
had become accustomed to welfare support. One particularly resilient 
rumor circulated that Somali refugees received free new cars from the 
government even though city officials repeatedly denied it. (In fact, 
most Somalis do hold jobs, adult ESL classes are in such great demand 
that there is a waiting list, and welfare statistics provided by Maine’s 
Department of Health and Human Services show that only a small 
percentage of the predominant forms of welfare assistance, Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families and food stamps, go to refugees.)
To be sure, some Lewistonians embraced the arrival of refugees and 
worked hard to befriend and offer assistance to the newcomers. A for-
mer city employee who devoted countless unpaid hours in 2001–02 to 
community education efforts about refugees and cultural skills classes 
for refugees recalled: “To be a local [working with refugees] during 
that time was awful. You were never not defending Somalis wherever 
you went. You were never able to turn off your job.” More recently, a 
blogger writing in response to an article in the local newspaper chas-
tised some of the bloggers quoted above for their racist and conde-
scending comments by arguing, “It is our capability to love and to care 
that define us, where is this humanity, when we are shutting our doors 
to neighbors where opportunities can be discovered. We now have a 
whole new culture to learn about, and we do not even have to leave 
our own backyard, what a beautiful gift.”34 Those who expressed sup-
port for the newcomers in blogs or private conversations emphasized 
the benefits of diversity brought by the refugees. But the interviews, 
conversations, and media reviews I conducted as part of my research 
suggest that the far more universal sentiment was antagonistic and 
unsympathetic. Most Lewistonians did not want their city to be a ref-
uge and viewed the refugees as an unwelcome foreign presence and a 
great economic burden.35
The slow and resistant extension of assistance and support to Lew-
iston’s new refugees by most city agencies and organizations and the 
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outright hostility of many Lewistonians toward the refugees cannot 
be viewed as peculiar to Lewiston but rather are indicative of broader 
American patterns. The reaction to the arrival of refugees by the citizens 
of Lewiston demonstrates how easily the rhetoric of economics trumps 
all other concerns and eviscerates arguments about humanitarianism 
and the benefits of diversity. While racism and fear of the foreign 
undoubtedly played into Lewiston’s reaction, the primary objections to 
the arrival of refugees were framed in terms of their economic impact. 
Even though the facts show that the presence of refugees has brought 
economic resources and vitality into the area (including, for example, 
at least $9 million in grant funding during 2001–2010 and about 18 new 
stores downtown owned and operated by Somalis),36 the public dis-
course about how much the refugees cost the city has only grown over 
the past decade. Talking about money allows people who are unhappy 
about refugees in their city to avoid accusations of racism and silences 
dissenting humanitarian voices as out-of-touch “softies” and tax-and-
spend liberals.
VII. Refuge?
While criticisms of the refugee presence circulated in the hallways of 
office buildings, schools, and businesses as well as in private conversa-
tions, online blogs and published editorials, the refugees themselves 
were far more occupied with the daily challenge of creating refuge. In 
cultural orientation classes held in the refugee camps that were sup-
posed to prepare them for life in America, they were taught to expect 
freedom, safety, the ability to have an education and a job, and the 
benefits of democracy. Once they arrived in America, however, their 
experience was far different from what their classes led them to expect. 
What has refuge meant to Somali Bantus who are now living in Lew-
iston?
Despite the emphasis in the news articles cited above about the pro-
jected challenges of new technology, Somali Bantu refugees easily mas-
tered everyday American technology. Within a few days Somali Bantu 
refugees were flushing toilets, using washing machines, chatting on 
cell phones, crossing busy streets, and cooking with gas and electricity. 
Within a few months they were driving. The real challenges were over-
coming the burden of grief and trauma, defining a new identity in the 
U.S., adjusting to American cultural norms, and struggling to earn an 
income and meet the expectation of economic self-sufficiency.
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For nearly every resettled Somali Bantu refugee, refuge in America 
has meant abandoning family members in Kenya. During the process 
of screening and rescreening, many Somali Bantu people were rejected 
for resettlement because their American interviewers suspected they 
were lying about their ethnicity or their kinship relations.37 While 
about 10,000 were ultimately resettled in the U.S., at least 3,000 were 
rejected and remain stuck in Kenya’s refugee camps. Families were 
torn apart as the interviewers accepted some siblings for resettlement 
and rejected others or accepted one spouse for resettlement but not the 
other. Parents had to choose whether to come to the U.S. with some 
children while abandoning others; husbands and wives had to decide 
whether to come if it meant leaving their loved one and possibly their 
children. Refuge in America has thus meant daily grief about those left 
behind.
In addition to the grief of loss, many Somali Bantu refugees suffer 
from terrible memories of the things that happened to them during the 
war and experience daily stress from the challenges of adjusting to life 
in America. Treating trauma and issues of mental health are left to the 
private sector and voluntary organizations. Mental health is not priori-
tized as part of refuge, and the federal Office of Refugee Resettlement 
(ORR), which manages funding and policy for resettlement, offers 
little beyond an acknowledgement that trauma and grief can hinder 
a refugee’s ability to perform as a worker. In their first decade in Lew-
iston, no mental health agencies offered refugees culturally competent 
services or programs.
For nearly every resettled Somali Bantu refugee, refuge in America 
means living with a new identity and family constructed through the 
resettlement process. People’s names were changed and birthdays were 
assigned by interviewers (most adult Somali Bantu refugees in the U.S. 
now have a birthday of January 1, which, paradoxically, police and 
social services workers often view as an indication of fraudulent iden-
tities). Extended families were restructured to conform to U.S. kinship 
norms. Polygamous marriages were dissolved as husbands were told 
to choose one wife only, while the divorced wives and their children 
were resettled separately or left behind. Parents accepted for resettle-
ment whose adult children were rejected often tried to claim their 
grandchildren as children, becoming their “parents” rather than their 
grandparents. Many rejected for resettlement tried to send their chil-
dren with other relatives or friends, thereby constituting new families. 
Thus refuge means living in both kinship worlds: the world of the ref-
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ugee camp where one’s family loyalties and pre-resettlement identity 
require ongoing support in the form of remittances, and the world of 
Lewiston with a different name and a new family structure. Refugees 
know that their juggling of identity to conform to resettlement criteria 
is called fraud by U.S. authorities, and thus refuge has meant creating 
a web of secrecy about their past and their dearest family members still 
living in camps.
Somali Bantu refugees have quickly learned that refuge in the U.S. 
means poverty. In the Orwellian words of one resettled Somali Bantu 
woman, “There is freedom here. But you need a job to be free.”38 The 
expectation that everyone over the age of sixteen will be employed 
means that refugees—even those in high school—must emphasize 
work over education. It imprisons those with limited English and lit-
eracy in the lowest wage, least secure, least desirable jobs for the rest 
of their lives. It closes the doors to opportunity, to education, to profes-
sional development, and it turns the refugees into worker drudges at 
the bottom of the socioeconomic hierarchy. For those with competent 
English but less competent writing skills and no professional creden-
tials, it means their best option often lies with seeking employment 
as cultural brokers and oral translators, jobs that offer limited profes-
sional mobility or development. Many refugee adults in their 30s, who 
work at minimum wage jobs as cart pushers, cleaners, and box cutters 
in places like Walmart, Dunkin Donuts, and LL Bean, have told me that 
they now recognize that this country offers no career opportunities for 
them and their only hope is that their children might have a chance for 
a better job.
“Since its enactment, nearly three million refugees who were once 
persecuted in their home countries have resettled in the Land of the 
Free,” says the Director of ORR in a poster celebrating the 30th anni-
versary of the Refugee Act of 1980. But the Land of the Free inhibits 
many basic freedoms viewed as normal by Somali Bantus refugees. 
The freedom to live without war has come at the cost of the freedom to 
follow cultural practices. Somali Bantu refugees recognize that many 
of their cultural practices are unacceptable in America—for example, 
polygyny, spiritual healing practices that include trance and posses-
sion, the desire to observe Muslim prayer practices and holy days in 
the workplace and at school, and the freedom to speak about their 
frustrations and challenges with life in this country. They have learned 
that these activities provide fuel for those who object to their presence 
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and speculate about links between Muslim refugees and terrorists. 
What does refuge mean in the context of racism and xenophobia?
Because refugees are supposed to be grateful and politically docile, 
refuge can be experienced as a loss of political agency in relation to 
their lives in their new communities. Their voices are silenced in local 
public discourse because refugees are seen as economically impotent 
and politically disenfranchised because they cannot apply for citizen-
ship for five years—and even then only once they have learned enough 
English to pass the test. Quoting Hannah Arendt’s observation (offered 
in a different context) that refugees are denied the right to an opinion, 
Peter Nyers comments, “Without citizenship, refugees are denied not 
only political rights but also something more fundamental—the capac-
ity to speak politically and the expectation that they will be heard.”39 
Despite their public visibility in Lewiston, refugees are politically invis-
ible. They have few political advocates because as nonvoters no one is 
accountable to them. As citizens-in-waiting, Somalis cannot run for 
office and have even been barred from serving on city task forces and 
committees. The local NGOs that provide support services for refugees 
are not necessarily political advocates or activists for refugees because 
their funding depends on maintaining good relationships with donors 
and administrators, most of whom treat refugee affairs with great cau-
tion. (One remarkable exception in Lewiston is the former mayor, Larry 
Gilbert, whose term ended in 2011, who often spoke out forcefully and 
publicly about the benefits to Lewiston of the Somali population.) Fur-
thermore, the practice of deportation for criminal convictions means 
noncitizen refugees are actually held to a higher standard than citizens, 
for whom rehabilitation rather than deportation follows jail time.40
Evaluating the humanitarianism of U.S. resettlement practices thus 
appears complex. A resettlement agenda that insists on low wage, 
dead-end jobs rather than educational growth and economic support 
for those making an enormous cultural and geographic transition 
slots refugees into a generic illegitimate immigrant category. They are 
treated as lucky to have the chance to be here, responsible for their own 
future, devoid of political agency, and obligated to conform cultur-
ally. The idea that refuge might include support for managing trauma, 
social support for the enormous life transformation resettled refugees 
experience, and economic support to ensure that refugees have ade-
quate time to develop language and job skills is absent because the U.S. 
lacks a developed public discourse that refuge should include any-
thing other than physical relocation. As one resettled Somali refugee 
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asked rhetorically in a conversation with me about his experiences in 
coming here, “What is the basic reason that you bring me to an ocean 
and then tell me to go swim by myself?” The sink-or-swim attitude is 
a neo-liberal definition of refuge, steeped in economic rationalities and 
valuations.
VIII. Conclusion
The resettlement of Somali Bantu refugees in America was to be a 
humanitarian act to bring persecuted refugees from the desperation 
and danger of refugee camps to the safety and opportunity of the 
United States. For this privilege, Somali Bantu paid for their own air-
fare (travel on U.S. carriers was mandatory), redefined their identities 
and family relationships to meet American criteria for resettlement, 
and left behind family members who failed to meet the criteria. In the 
U.S., they learned that refuge is an obligation to become a low-wage 
earner and that the basis of their humanity as a refugee is limited to 
their ability to earn an income.
There is no doubt that the resettlement program saved lives and is 
a far better option than life in a refugee camp. But the Lewiston case 
shows that refugees who cannot quickly adapt to their new life because 
they lack the skills relevant for the American context experience a 
lack of support from the American government and society during 
their adjustment. In Lewiston, the city found itself utterly unprepared 
and unsupported, trying frantically to help refugees adjust, while city 
citizens complained and the state’s only VOLAG, local churches, and 
nonprofits remained on the sidelines. For the city, as evidenced in the 
mayor’s letter, the primary consideration was cost: the presence of 
refugees would become an economic burden that they did not want to 
shoulder. The dissenting voices who suggested the refugees brought 
a revitalizing potential, desirable diversity, and a common humanity 
that should provoke empathy were roundly dismissed in blogs and 
private and public conversations. Their views were rejected on the 
basis of assumptions about how much refugees cost, even when they 
cost very little at all.
A blog conversation in response to an article in the Lewiston Sun Jour-
nal about a Somali language class taught at Lewiston’s Adult Ed pro-
gram summarizes the common sentiment. A long series of responses 
decrying the Somali language course and opining that Somalis should 
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learn English and get jobs concludes with this exchange between two 
bloggers identified as joeziehmer and whcosta:
Joeziehmer: “They do want to learn English but in truer form English is 
one of the hardest languages to learn. I think this speaks volumes about 
the intellectual failings on display of racism and prejudice concerning 
learning a language as opposed to learning empathy. Imagine if you 
cared enough to pay attention to immigrant cultural developments in 
history class whcosta.”
whcosta: “I don’t though. I care about economics.”41
In conclusion, the claim that refugee resettlement is a noble expres-
sion of humanitarianism is actually a shallow humanitarianism, 
guided more by an ethic of punitive neo-liberalism than one of gener-
ous humanism. The example of Somali Bantus is illustrative. By choos-
ing a group defined as one of the most vulnerable, impoverished, and 
subjugated, the government is making a symbolic statement of the 
U.S. as a welcoming nation. Yet the refugees’ incorporation into the 
nation positions them with other vulnerable, marginalized groups 
whose inclusion is defined by surveillance, discipline, moral judg-
ment, humiliation, and a neo-liberal calculus that defines one’s worth 
as equivalent to one’s earning power.
If the humanitarianism of a country can be evaluated by its treat-
ment of its poorest, most vulnerable members, scholars like Brett 
Williams, T. M. Luhrmann, and Philippe Bourgois have shown that 
the U.S. treats its most vulnerable (such as the poor, the mentally ill 
homeless, the drug-addicted homeless) with punitive and humiliating 
policies rather than humanist ones.42 Resettled illiterate refugees join 
others who struggle against enormous barriers to live a decent, satisfy-
ing, sustainable life but who are judged for their failures in a system in 
which everything is stacked against them. The help they are given is 
so modest compared to their needs. However, the rationale that they 
are being saved from the horror of refugee camps and being given the 
opportunity for a new life seems to excuse the extension of limited 
generosity in assisting their resettlement.
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